Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Peter Geach on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments
I 128 Belief about oneself/Geach: must be analyzed as a complex predicate. E.g. "Phillip thinks of Philip to be worst enemy of Philip.." is only unambiguous if "he himself" is inserted. >He/He himself, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Attribution, >Predication, >Self-reference, >Quasi-indicator. Geach: truth here is not depending on empiricism but on meanings. - "He himself" cannot be expressed in schemes such as "p>q". "Taking himself for being dead": is formally not true, because of the meanings of the subexpressions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |